CJCPMUNC

2026

NATO MILITARY

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Letter from the Chair

Dear MUN Delegates,

Welcome to the third annual CJCPMUNC! My name is Adwita Jagannathan, and it is my pleasure to be serving as your Chair for the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Military committee! I am currently a senior here at Central Jersey College Prep Charter School, and I have been part of the Model UN team for the past three years. I first began my Model UN journey in 9th grade, not knowing anything about international relations or even public speaking. However, over the past couple years of attending various Model UN conferences, I have gained so much valuable knowledge and lessons that I am excited to share with you all!

Although it may be nerve-wracking to walk into the committee room on the day of the conference, just remember that all of us are there for the same purpose: to expand our thinking through collaboration. As we gather in our committee to discuss critical global issues, remember that each of you will play an important role in shaping the conversations and debates that will take place. Whether you're a first-time delegate or an experienced one, your diverse perspectives on our topic are what will make this conference meaningful.

By participating in this conference, you will not only be creating change in the world, but you will also be able to improve your own skills. Model UN is a chance for you to improve your public speaking, demonstrate leadership, and meet new people. Although it may seem intimidating, I strongly encourage you to put yourself out there at the conference. Share your thoughts with the other delegates, explore creative solutions together, and don't be afraid to challenge ideas! In the end, your inputs and ideas will play a major role in helping the committee come to a successful resolution.

Please don't hesitate to reach out to me at my email for any questions or concerns you may have. I look forward to meeting and working with you all at the conference, and I wish you the best of luck!

Sincerely,
Adwita Jagannathan
CJCPMUN Chair

Letter from the Vice-Chair

Dear MUN Delegates,

Hi! My name is Shloak Menon and I will be the Vice Chair for the NATO Military committee. Thanks for coming to CJCPMUN and I can't wait to meet and work with you!

I'm a senior at CJCP and have been doing Model UN for 6 years. I love working with computers and plan to pursue a career doing something related to them. In my free time, I love to code projects, play video games, play the piano, and bowl. I love to listen to a lot of music and my favorite genres of music, in order, are Hyperpop, Rap, Pop, K-pop, EDM, Indie Rock, and J-pop.

I began Model UN in 6th grade with a group of 3 friends just because everyone else had gone into Science Olympiad and Robotics and we felt like we'd have more fun doing the other club available. Since then, Model UN has been a big part of my life and almost all of my best friends and memories have been made while preparing for and during competitions. Even though I should be talking about the way it has built my public speaking skills or my ability to think about solutions that could change the world later, I think of it more of a thing to do to make new friends or just have a fun time that can't be had anywhere else. Going into this club with this mindset has helped me tremendously and I highly recommend doing so yourself.

I am more than happy to be able to communicate with any of you before, during, or after the competition. If you would like to reach me, you can do so through my email, which is shloakmenon@cjcollegeprep.org. I look forward to seeing you all there during committee!

Sincerely,
Shloak Menon
CJCPMUN Vice Chair

Rules of Procedure

The Rules of procedure are three types: Motions (Verbal and Non-Verbal), Points, and Yields.

Verbal Motions

1. **Motion to Set the Agenda:** "Country X motions to set the agenda in favor of topic X." Note that, since there will be one topic per committee this year, the agenda will already be set in favor of each committee's topic. This Motion Requires an Absolute Majority
2. **Motion to Set the Speakers List:** "Country X motions to set the Speakers List to Y seconds." This Motion Requires an Absolute Majority.
3. **Motion to Suspend the Debate:** The debate can be suspended to a moderated or unmoderated caucus, soliciting of third parties, or consultation of the whole.
    a. **Moderated Caucus:** "Country X motions to suspend the debate for a moderated caucus to discuss Y for a total time of Z minutes and speakers time of V seconds." This Motion Requires an Absolute Majority.
    b. **Unmoderated Caucus:** "Country X motions to suspend the debate for an unmoderated caucus for the purpose of Y for a total time of Z minutes". This Motion Requires an Absolute Majority.
    c. **Consultation of the Whole:** "Country X motions to suspend the debate for a consultation of the whole, to discuss Y for a total time of Z minutes." This Motion Requires an Absolute Majority.
4. **Motion to Introduce Draft Resolution:** "Country X motions to introduce Draft Resolutions." This Motion Requires an Absolute Majority.
5. **Motion to Begin Debating on Amendments:** "Country X motions to begin debating on amendments." This Motion Requires an Absolute Majority.
6. **Motion to Adjourn the Meeting:** "Country X motions to adjourn the meeting for the purpose of lunch." This Motion Requires an Absolute Majority.
7. **Motion to Close the Debate:** "Country X motions to close the debate and move into voting procedures..." This Motion Requires a Two-Thirds Majority.

Written Motions

1. **Right of Reply:** This is requested when a delegate feels that another delegate has made a derogatory comment to the country they are representing. There is no Right of Reply to a Right of Reply.
2. **Appeal to the Chair's Decision:** This is used when a delegate feels that the chair committed a mistake or acted unfairly.

Points:

- **Point of Order:** This is used when a delegate feels that the chair or a fellow delegate has made an error in the running of the committee. This Point is Interruptive.
- **Point of Parliamentary Procedure:** Also known as a point of inquiry, this is used when a delegate has a question regarding the rules of procedure or flow of debate. This Point is Non-Interruptive.
- **Point of Personal Privilege:** This is used when a delegate has a certain personal discomfort. This Point is Interruptive.
- **Point of Information:** This is used when a delegate does not understand or needs more clarification on a certain speech or notion that a delegate gave. This Point is Non-Interruptive.

Yields:

Yields are only used when a delegate does not use their whole speaking time during the formal debate. There are three types:

1. **Yield to the Chair**
2. **Yield to Another Delegate**
3. **Yield to Questions**

Amendment:

There are two types of amendments:

1. **Friendly Amendments:** A change to a draft resolution that all sponsors of the latter agree with.
2. **Unfriendly Amendments:** A change to a draft resolution that not all sponsors agree with. This Amendment requires an Absolute Majority vote to pass.

Passage of Resolutions:

In small committees, Draft Resolutions will require a two-thirds majority to pass. In large committees, they will require an absolute majority. **Each Chairperson will point out at the beginning of the session the 'required number to pass' votes that will be applied in each committee.**



Committee Introduction

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a political and military alliance established in 1949 by twelve founding nations, including the United States, Canada, as well as several Western European Nations. Created in the aftermath of World War II, NATO was designed to provide collective defence against the threats posed by the Soviet Union at the time. Its core principle is outlined in Article 5 of the NATO treaty, and it states that an attack on one member nation is considered an attack on all the member nations. Over the past 7 decades, this framework of collective security continues to remain the cornerstone of the NATO committee's mission.

Since its founding, NATO has now expanded to 31 member states and has evolved to address a wider range of global security challenges. Beyond territorial defense, NATO has now taken on roles in crisis management, cooperative security, counter-terrorism, and more. It has also led significant military operations, such as interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya. Additionally, the committee supports global security through partnerships with non-member nations and international organizations, thereby promoting democratic values and building stronger collective defense capabilities.

NATO's military power today is drawn from the combined capabilities and commitments of its member nations, supported by a complex yet coordinated structure that enables rapid deployment and joint action across nations. It maintains a high level of readiness through regular joint training exercises, as well as investments into advanced technologies. Although originally focused on deterring Soviet aggression in Europe, NATO now faces a broader spectrum of global threats, including cyber warfare, disinformation, and new technologies. As global security dynamics continue to shift in the 21st century, NATO remains a significant factor in maintaining international stability and upholding the rules-based international order.

Topic Introduction

Since its founding, NATO has relied on a combination of both conventional and nuclear forces to deter aggression and maintain stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. A major component of this strategy is the principle of nuclear deterrence, which has played a key role in NATO's defense posture, especially during the Cold War. While the nature of global threats has evolved since the post-Cold War era, NATO continues to maintain the stance that nuclear weapons provide a credible and essential deterrent in its defense policy, especially against nuclear threats from adversaries such as Russia.

NATO's nuclear policy is grounded in the concept of "nuclear sharing," where non-nuclear member states host US nuclear weapons under joint operational control. This arrangement serves both strategic and political purposes, since it reinforces collective defense under Article 5 of the NATO treaty and helps distribute the burden of nuclear deterrence among member states. However, this policy has been the subject of growing debate, particularly among European allies who continue to question the moral, strategic, and security implications of continuing this reliance on nuclear weapons in a changing global landscape in the 21st century.

As geopolitical tensions continue to arise, especially in the context of Russia's war in Ukraine and increased nuclear rhetoric from Moscow, the relevance and risks of NATO's current nuclear strategy have come under repeated observation and criticism. Critics of the current nuclear policy argue that the reliance on nuclear weapons may escalate conflicts or provoke arms races, whereas supporters of the policy maintain that a credible nuclear deterrent remains indispensable in deterring existential threats. It is essential to analyze and raise questions regarding the historical context, current policies, and future global disarmament efforts of NATO's nuclear strategy, evaluating how it aligns with broader goals of collective defense and international security.

Historical Context and Evolution of NATO's Nuclear Policy

NATO's nuclear policy first originated during the early Cold War as a response to the Soviet Union's growing military power and nuclear capabilities. Since it was founded as a collective defense alliance, NATO initially relied on conventional forces, but soon recognized the need for a nuclear deterrent to offset the Soviet numerical superiority in Europe. The United States deployed nuclear weapons in Europe as part of its commitment to defend Western Europe, establishing a nuclear umbrella over NATO allies. This strategy was formally supported by the doctrine of massive retaliation, established in the 1950s, which threatened an overwhelming nuclear response to Soviet aggression.

In 1966, France withdrew from NATO's integrated military command to pursue an independent nuclear policy, but the alliance maintained a multilateral nuclear framework through a policy called nuclear sharing. This policy involved the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in several NATO countries, including Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey, with these nations participating in the planning and potential delivery of these weapons via dual-capable aircraft technologies. The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which was established in 1966, provided political consultations on nuclear matters, giving non-nuclear members a voice in NATO's nuclear position.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the end of the Cold War, NATO's nuclear policy went through significant reevaluation. The immediate threat of large-scale nuclear conflict in Europe lessened, leading to arms reduction initiatives such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START). NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept reaffirmed the role of nuclear weapons as a guarantee of the security of the Allies, while emphasizing arms control, non-proliferation, and transparency within this policy. However, despite these changes, NATO maintained its existing nuclear deterrent capabilities, seeing them as essential to combating emerging threats and preserving the strength of the alliance. The alliance also incorporated new dimensions into its strategy, including missile defense and addressing threats from rogue states and terrorism.

Today, NATO's nuclear policy is clearly outlined in its latest Strategic Concept (2022) and other official documents, emphasizing a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent as a significant component of its collective defense, especially given recent geopolitical tensions involving Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Today, NATO continues the practice of nuclear sharing among its member nations, with U.S. nuclear weapons currently deployed in five European countries. The alliance also commits to modernizing its existing nuclear forces, such as the ongoing development of the U.S. B61-12 nuclear bomb, to maintain credible deterrence. However, while doing this, NATO supports arms control and non-proliferation efforts, in an attempt to balance deterrence with efforts to reduce worldwide nuclear risks.

Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non Proliferation

Arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation have long been central components of global efforts to manage the risks posed by nuclear weapons. Arms control refers to international agreements that seek to regulate and limit the number, type, and deployment of weapons in order to reduce the chances of conflict and prevent destabilizing arms races. Arms control efforts first gained momentum during the Cold War, as the United States and the Soviet Union negotiated treaties such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. These agreements introduced limits on nuclear arsenals and helped reduce tensions between the two nations. Disarmament aims at the reduction or complete elimination of certain weapons categories, usually motivated by the desire for a safer and more peaceful world. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signed in 1968, plays a crucial role in nonproliferation by legally binding nuclear-armed states to pursue disarmament and preventing non-nuclear states from acquiring nuclear weapons.

In the context of NATO, these initiatives influence but don't entirely dictate the alliance's nuclear posture. Established during the Cold War as a deterrent against Soviet aggression, NATO's nuclear strategy was initially designed to counterbalance the Soviet threats with a credible nuclear deterrent. Since then, arms control agreements have shaped NATO's approach by providing mechanisms for reducing risks and increasing transparency, but the alliance continues to emphasize deterrence as a necessary defense measure. NATO's current policy says that while supporting arms control and nonproliferation efforts, they must maintain a nuclear strategy capable of responding to a wide range of threats. This includes modernizing nuclear forces, such as the U.S. B61-12 bomb, to ensure the reliability and effectiveness of NATO's nuclear posture in the 21st century.

Disarmament within NATO remains a significant issue. While the organization publicly endorses the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons, it views full disarmament as unrealistic, especially regarding Russia's nuclear capabilities and rising geopolitical tensions. NATO's nuclear sharing policy, which involves U.S. nuclear weapons being stationed in non-nuclear member states such as Germany and Turkey, complicates its relationship with the NPT. Some argue that nuclear sharing undermines nonproliferation goals by involving non-nuclear states in nuclear operations. However, NATO defends this arrangement as compliant with the NPT because the weapons remain under U.S. control during times of peace, and non-nuclear states do not possess independent nuclear technology.

Arms control and nonproliferation are increasingly challenged by new factors and emerging technologies. The erosion of key treaties, such as the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty in 2019 and uncertainties surrounding the future of New START, create a more unpredictable nuclear landscape. Additionally, concerns about nuclear proliferation in regions like the Middle East and East Asia add complexity to NATO's nuclear strategy and the global nonproliferation regime.

Emerging Technologies and Stability

Emerging technologies are rapidly transforming the environment in which NATO's nuclear defense posture operates. While nuclear deterrence has traditionally relied on the concepts of mutual assured destruction and clear lines of communication, the integration of new technologies like hypersonic missiles, artificial intelligence, and advanced cyber capabilities can complicate those concepts. These technologies tend to reduce reaction times and increase uncertainty, especially during moments of heightened tension. For instance, hypersonic weapons can travel at speeds and altitudes that make them difficult to detect and intercept, which challenges existing early-warning systems. At the same time, the increasing use of AI and automated decision-making tools raises concerns about how much human oversight will remain in nuclear command and control structures. This growing unpredictability makes the risk of miscalculation or unintended escalation more pronounced, particularly in scenarios where mistrust and rapid response postures already dominate military planning.

One of the major concerns is that these technologies may lower the threshold for escalation. For example, cyber attacks targeting command-and-control systems or missile defense infrastructure could be seen as the first step in a larger offensive, even if the original intent was limited. Similarly, autonomous or semi-autonomous systems powered by artificial intelligence could act unpredictably or make high-speed decisions that reduce opportunities for human judgment. These features increase the risk of miscalculation or accidental conflict, particularly in situations where states have limited time to assess whether a threat is conventional or nuclear in nature. In a highly networked and fast-moving environment, the chances of misunderstanding or overreacting to threats become much greater.

At the same time, emerging technologies also offer NATO valuable tools to reinforce deterrence and improve situational awareness. Enhanced surveillance systems, faster data processing, and more resilient communication networks can strengthen NATO's ability to detect threats early and coordinate responses effectively. However, the benefits of these advancements depend heavily on how they are integrated into policy and doctrine. Without international norms or agreements governing the use of these technologies in nuclear contexts, uncertainty will remain a central challenge. While innovation can enhance security, it also demands caution, transparency, and cooperation to avoid creating new pathways to instability.

Internal NATO Debates and Opinions

Inside NATO, there are significant debates over how nuclear weapons should figure into the Alliance's future strategy. Some member states argue that nuclear deterrence remains absolutely essential because it emphasizes the credibility of NATO's defense system. For those states, the presence of U.S. forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe and systems for nuclear sharing (where non-nuclear members host or are prepared to deliver nuclear bombs) help bind the Alliance together and reassure nations on the eastern team. On the other hand, there are allies who question whether the risks associated with nuclear weapons, such as escalation, political backlash, cost, and diplomatic consequences, might outweigh their deterrent benefits in current security environments. There is also a worry in some nations that an over-reliance on nuclear weapons might reduce incentives to strengthen conventional forces, missile defense, or hybrid/cyber defense capabilities.

Another area of controversy is around doctrines and policies; whether NATO should maintain diplomacy around nuclear first use, how much readiness nuclear weapons should have, and what role emerging threats (such cyber, AI, and space) should play in shaping the nuclear posture. Some NATO members press for more transparency, stricter controls, or even partial restraint to reduce the risks of miscalculation. Others insist that flexibility and ambiguity are strategic assets, since they make deterrence more credible by keeping potential adversaries uncertain about how NATO might respond. Debates also take place about burden sharing, such as which states host nuclear assets, which contribute aircraft or delivery mechanisms, how NATO's Nuclear Planning Group operates, etc.

A third source of debate deals with political and moral legitimacy. Several NATO countries have populations that are increasingly skeptical about the role of nuclear weapons, whether for ethical, environmental, or non-proliferation reasons. There is concern about the diplomatic costs of maintaining or expanding nuclear roles, especially in regions where public opinion strongly favors disarmament or non-nuclear postures. At the same time, there are voices within NATO who view nuclear weapons as linked to the Alliance's credibility, especially in the face of growing threats. The question of credibility also extends to how NATO communicates; whether it should emphasize that nuclear weapons are strictly deterrent, last-resort tools, how stale or new threats are described, and how NATO can preserve cohesion among countries with divergent public attitudes.

Country Stances

Belgium – Belgium participates in NATO's nuclear sharing program and hosts U.S. nuclear weapons at Kleine Brogel Air Base. While its government supports NATO's deterrence posture, domestic opinion leans toward nuclear disarmament, creating ongoing political tension about modernization programs.

Canada – Canada supports NATO's nuclear deterrence as part of collective defense but does not host nuclear weapons. It emphasizes arms control and disarmament diplomacy, advocating for reduced nuclear reliance within NATO strategies.

Croatia – As a newer NATO member, Croatia aligns closely with alliance policy and supports deterrence as a stabilizing tool. It generally defers to NATO consensus but prioritizes regional stability and conventional defense over nuclear expansion.

Denmark – Denmark strongly supports NATO's collective defense but has a long-standing policy of not allowing nuclear weapons on its territory in peacetime. It advocates for balancing deterrence with arms control and non-proliferation.

Finland – As one of NATO's newest members, Finland values the protection provided by NATO's nuclear umbrella but has no intention of hosting nuclear weapons. It supports strong deterrence combined with responsible arms control.

France – France maintains an independent nuclear arsenal and does not participate in NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements. It views its own nuclear forces as essential to European strategic autonomy while supporting NATO's overall deterrence posture.

Germany – Germany is a key participant in NATO's nuclear sharing policy, hosting U.S. nuclear weapons. However, public debate over disarmament versus deterrence is strong, with some political factions pushing for withdrawal from nuclear sharing.

Greece – Greece no longer hosts U.S. nuclear weapons but remains committed to NATO's deterrence strategy. It supports the balance between credible defense and disarmament diplomacy.

Hungary – Hungary supports NATO's nuclear deterrence and U.S. extended nuclear umbrella but does not host nuclear weapons. It tends to align with alliance policy without pushing for nuclear reform debates.

Iceland – Iceland does not maintain its own military or host nuclear weapons, but it supports NATO's deterrence strategy as necessary for transatlantic security. It emphasizes arms control, transparency, and peaceful diplomacy.

Italy – Italy is one of the key hosts of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe under NATO's sharing program. It supports nuclear deterrence as vital for alliance security while also backing global arms control efforts.

Lithuania – Given its proximity to Russia and Belarus, Lithuania strongly supports NATO's nuclear deterrent as essential to Eastern European security. It advocates for increased readiness and a firm stance against Russian aggression.

Luxembourg – Luxembourg does not host nuclear weapons but supports NATO's overall nuclear policy as part of collective defense. It emphasizes the importance of diplomacy and arms reduction.

Netherlands – The Netherlands participates in nuclear sharing and hosts U.S. nuclear weapons at Volkel Air Base. While supportive of NATO deterrence, it is also active in disarmament advocacy, reflecting public pressure for a reduced nuclear role.

Norway – Norway supports NATO's nuclear strategy but prohibits nuclear weapons on its territory in peacetime. It emphasizes the need for arms control, transparency, and dialogue with Russia.

Poland – Poland is one of the strongest proponents of NATO's nuclear deterrent, particularly since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. While it does not host nuclear weapons, it has expressed interest in participating in nuclear sharing to strengthen regional defense.

Portugal – Portugal supports NATO's nuclear deterrence policy but prioritizes conventional and maritime security contributions. It emphasizes a balance between deterrence and disarmament diplomacy.

Romania – Romania supports NATO's nuclear deterrence posture, viewing it as essential against Russian aggression. It does not host nuclear weapons but supports modernization and extended deterrence.

Spain – Spain does not host nuclear weapons but fully supports NATO's deterrence strategy. It stresses maintaining nuclear capability as a last-resort defense measure while promoting disarmament dialogue.

Sweden – As a recent NATO member, Sweden supports the nuclear umbrella for collective defense but has no intention of hosting nuclear weapons. It remains a strong advocate for disarmament and non-proliferation diplomacy.

Türkiye (Turkey) – Türkiye plays a central role in NATO's nuclear sharing arrangement, hosting U.S. nuclear weapons at Incirlik Air Base. It strongly supports nuclear deterrence but occasionally uses its role to leverage diplomatic influence within NATO.

United Kingdom – The U.K. maintains its own independent nuclear deterrent (the Trident system) and sees it as vital to NATO's collective defense. It supports alliance modernization while promoting strategic stability and non-proliferation.

United States – The U.S. is NATO's primary nuclear power and the provider of the alliance's nuclear umbrella. It leads modernization efforts, supports nuclear sharing, and views deterrence as the cornerstone of NATO's defense posture.

Questions to Think About

1. To what extent are nuclear weapons essential to NATO's current defense strategy?
2. What are the political and ethical implications of deploying nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear NATO members?
3. What role should arms control and disarmament play in NATO's strategic planning?
4. How might changes in US nuclear policy impact NATO's nuclear posture?
5. Can NATO maintain unity among member states while having differing views on nuclear weapons?

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